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Abstract 
Without actively aligning the reference frames, the reference-frame-independent quantum key 
distribution (RFI-QKD) can generate secure keys even when the reference frames drift slowly. Here, 
we propose a new scheme on the decoy-state RFI-QKD, where the basis assignments of two 
legitimate parties are biased, reducing the fraction of mismatched-basis data. When accounting for 
statistical fluctuations under different misalignments of reference frames, we investigate the 
performance of biased decoy-state RFI-QKD with full parameter optimization. We also make a clear 
comparison between the new scheme with other practical schemes, e.g., unbiased decoy-state RFI-
QKD and biased decoy-state BB84-QKD. Simulation results demonstrate that the new proposed 
biased decoy-state RFI-QKD can significantly improve the performance (secret key rate and secure 
transmission distance) of practical QKD systems. 
 
Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide a feasible approach for two remote peers, Alice 
and Bob, to share unconditionally secure keys even in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve [1-3]. 
Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the first well known BB84 QKD protocol in 1984 [4], a lot of 
achievements have been made both in theories [5-7] and experiments [8-13]. In most of reported 
QKD experiments, the reference frames should be actively aligned between Alice and Bob to assure 
the regular running of practical QKD systems. However, the alignment of reference frames will take 
up considerable long time overhead which could generate secret keys otherwise, and also makes 
QKD systems more complicated which may be deployed by Eve [14-15]. 
 
Thanks to the reference-frame-independent quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD) protocol 
proposed by Laing et al. [16], Alice and Bob may share secret keys without the alignment of 
reference frames. Moreover, due to the unavailability of ideal single-photon sources, phase-
randomized weak coherent sources which emit multi-photon states with nonzero probabilities are 
widely used in practical QKD systems. However, Eve can easily hack those multi-photon 
components by performing the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack without Alice and Bob's 
awareness [17-19]. To combat the PNS attack, the decoy-state method [20-25] was adopted in 
practical RFI-QKD systems. Up to date, there have been a few theoretical [26-27] and experimental 
[28-31] work on RFI-QKD. However, there exists shortcomings in each of them, e.g., the decoy-
state method was not employed in Refs. [27,30,31], the issue of statistical fluctuations was not taken 
into account in Refs. [26,29], and it used fixed basis choice and intensities in [28]. 
 
In this paper, we propose the high efficient decoy-state RFI-QKD scheme, where Alice and 
Bob's basis choices are biased to increase the fraction of matched-basis data. When accounting for 
statistical fluctuations and different misalignments of reference frames, we investigate our protocol 
with full parameter optimization [32]. Comparisons between this new proposed protocol and either 
unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKD or biased decoy-state BB84-QKD are made. Simulation results 
show that the new proposed biased decoy-state RFI-QKD can significantly improve the 
performance of practical QKD systems. The structure of the paper is as follows: In Sec II, we 
demonstrate biased decoy-state RFI-QKD protocol. In Sec III, we show corresponding simulation 
results. Finally, conclusions are given. 
Biased decoy-state RFI-QKD 
In perfect QKD systems, the reference frames X , Y and Z are well aligned, where 
0 1| 1 0 |X     , 0 1| 1 0 |Y i i     and 0 0 | 1 1|Z     . However, in most practical 
QKD systems, only one reference frame can be well aligned [16]. In RFI-QKD, Alice randomly 
prepares quantum states according to her bases AX , AY and AZ , and sends them to Bob. Once 
received the states from Alice, Bob measures those states according to his bases BX , BY and BZ . In 
this scheme, Z basis is stable which is used to distill secret keys. X andY bases are allowed to drift 
slowly which are used to estimate Eve's information. In other words, they follow: 
B AZ Z                                   (1) 
 cos sin ,B A AX X Y                              (2) 
cos sin ,B A AY Y X                              (3) 
where  is the misalignment of Alice and Bob's local X andY bases. 
Here, we propose the biased decoy-state RFI-QKD, and we concentrate on the widely used 3-
intensity decoy-state scheme, which employs one signal state (with an intensity of  ), one weak 
decoy state (with an intensity of ) and one vacuum state (with an intensity of 0). Alice randomly 
modulates pulses into three different intensities u , v and 0 with probabilities P , P and 1 P P   , 
respectively. For pulses with intensity ( ), she prepares states in her AZ basis with conditional 
probability |AZ
P  ( |AZP  ), AX basis with probability |AXP  ( |AXP  ) and AY basis with probability 
| |1 A AZ XP P   ( | |1 A AZ XP P   ). For vacuum states, Alice does not set any basis. Furthermore, 
Bob measures the incoming pulses by randomly choosing bases
BZ , BX and BY with probabilities
BZ
P ,
BX
P and 1
B BZ X
P P  . 
 
When taking statistical fluctuations into account, the total number of pulses sent by Alice can 
be denoted as N . Following the statistical fluctuation analysis in Refs. [33,34], the overall gain and 
quantum-bit error of states that Alice sends in
A (  , ,A A A AX Y Z  ) basis and Bob measures in 
B  (  , ,B B B BX Y Z  ) basis can be estimated by: 
,
|
1 ,
A B A B
A B A B
UQ Q
NP P P Q
 
    
     
   
 
 
                    (4) 
 
,
|
1 ,
A B A B
A B A B
LQ Q
NP P P Q
 
    
     
   
 
 
                    (5) 
, ,
|
 1 ,
A B A B A B A B
A B A B A B
U UE Q E Q
NP P P E Q
   
         
       
   
 
 
               (6) 
where superscripts  and represent signal states and decoy states respectively, superscriptsU  
and L denote the upper and lower bound of experimental results, and is the number of standard 
deviations which is directly related to the failure probability of the security analysis. Similarly, we 
can also get: 
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With the formulae above and decoy-state analytical method [35], we can estimate the lower bound 
of the yield and the upper bound of the error rate of single-photon contributions in A BZ Z , denoted 
as
1,
A B
L
Z ZY and
1,
A B
U
Z Ze , respectively. Similarly, the upper bound of the error rate of single-photon 
contributions in A BX X , A BX Y , A BY X and A BY Y  can also be estimated, each denoted as
1,
A B
U
X Xe , 
1,
A B
U
X Ye ,
1,
A B
U
Y Xe and
1,
A B
U
Y Ye . Then the intermediate quantityC is given by: 
       
2 2 2 2
1, 1, 1, 1,1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 .
A B A B A B A B
U U U U
X X X Y Y X Y YC e e e e                 (9) 
And Eve' information
EI is: 
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where ( )H x is the binary Shannon information function, given by 
2 2( ) log ( ) (1 )log (1 )H x x x x x     , and 
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According to the GLLP [36] security analysis, the final key generation rate can be calculated 
as: 
    1, 1,| 1 ,A B A B A B A BL UZ Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z ZR P P P fQ H E e Y H e                      (13) 
where
A BZ Z
Q and
A BZ Z
E represent the average counting rate and the quantum-bit error-rate of signal 
states in A BZ Z basis, respectively. f is a factor to evaluate the reconciliation efficiency in key 
reconciliation phase. 
 
Numerical simulation 
In order to acquire better performance with respect to key generation rate and secure 
transmission distance, full parameter optimization is carried out in this biased decoy-state RFI-QKD 
with statistical fluctuations, where ten parameters, including  , , P , P , |AZP  , |AZP  , |AXP  , 
|AX
P  , BZP and BXP , need to be optimized. The experimental parameters [37] listed in Table. 1 are 
employed in all the numerical simulation results presented in this section. 
 
Table. 1.  List of practical parameters for numerical simulations. is the detection efficiency 
of the single-photon detector, 0Y is the dark count rate of the single-photon detector, de is the 
probability of a photon arriving at the erroneous single-photon detector, is the loss coefficient of 
optical fiber, f is the key reconciliation efficiency in reconciliation phase,  is the confidence 
interval for statistical fluctuation with a failure probability of 
75.73 10 [33]. 
 
Considering statistical fluctuations, we investigate the biased decoy-state RFI-QKD at 
=0 ,10 ,20     with full parameter optimization. For the sake of contrast, we also investigate the 
performance of unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKD with reasonable parameters, i.e., 0.1  , 
1 3P P   , | | 1 3A AZ XP P   , | | 1 3A AZ XP P   , 1 3B BZ XP P  , and optimized   
at each distance [28]. All the key rates are simulated with a reasonable data size at
11=10N [32]. 
As shown in Fig.1, the key generation rates of the biased decoy-state RFI-QKD at different 
misalignments of reference frames have been improved with more than one order of magnitude, 
compared with those of unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKD. In addition, it is easy to see that the 
performance of biased decoy-state RFI-QKD will be depressed by the increasing of the rotation 
angle of the reference frames. e.g, the key rate of biased decoy-state RFI-QKD with =20  is lower 
than that of =10  . Despite with biggish rotation angle, the key rate of biased decoy-state RFI-
QKD with =20  is still higher than that of unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKD with =0  when the 
distance is shorter than 140 km. Therefore, it is significant to adopt our biased decoy-state RFI-
QKD scheme which can remarkably improve the performance of practical RFI-QKD systems. 
 
Fig. 1.  Comparison of the key generation rates between the full optimized biased and unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKD at different 
misalignments of reference frames. The curves from top to bottom are the secret key rates of biased decoy-state RFI-QKD with
=0 ,10 ,20    , and unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKD with =0 ,10 ,20    , respectively. 
 
By adopting full parameter optimization, we also make a comparison between the biased 
decoy-state RFI-QKD and biased quantum key distribution with BB84 protocol (BB84-QKD) at 
different misalignments of reference frames with
11=10N . Corresponding simulation results are 
shown in Fig.2. Generally, the reference frames between Alice and Bob in biased decoy-state BB84-
QKD should be actively aligned, which will obviously take up considerable long time overhead. 
And the time of alignments is difficult to evaluate. For simplicity, we consider biased BB84-QKD 
suffers the same misalignments as biased RFI-QKD. As shown in Fig.2, the key generation rates of 
biased decoy-state RFI-QKD decline slowly with the increase of rotation angles, compared with 
those of biased decoy-state QKD. 
 
Fig. 2.  Comparison of the key generation rates between the biased decoy-state RFI-QKD and BB84-QKD at different 
misalignments of reference frames. The solid curve, dash curve and dot curve refer to RFI-QKD with =0 ,10 ,20    , respectively. 
The short dash curve, short dot curve and short dash dot curve refer to BB84-QKD with =0 ,10 ,20    , respectively. 
 
Furthermore, the key rates of biased decoy-state RFI-QKD with various total numbers of pulses 
from 109 to 1013 at a fixed distance of 100 km are displayed in Fig.3. From this figure it is obvious 
that the key generation rates of biased decoy-state RFI-QKD decline less than one order of 
magnitude when data size N  reduces from 1013 to 109. Even though with short communication 
time and small data size, biased decoy-state RFI-QKD can still generate considerable secret keys. 
Hence, it is efficient to adopt the biased decoy-state RFI-QKD under the situation when the 
reference frames drift slowly. 
 Fig. 3.  The optimized key generation rates (per pulse) versus different total numbers of pulses N for biased decoy-state RFI-QKD 
at the distance of 100 km with different rotation angles. Curves from top to bottom refer to biased decoy-state RFI-QKD with
=0 ,10 ,20    , respectively. 
 
Conclusions 
In summary, we have proposed a biased decoy-state RFI-QKD scheme, where Alice and Bob's 
basis choices are set biased to increase the fraction of matched-basis data. We carry out the full 
parameter optimization method to optimize the achievable key generation rate and transmission 
distance. Our simulation results demonstrate that the key generation rate of full optimized biased 
decoy-state RFI-QKD can be enhanced by more than one order of magnitude compared to those of 
unbiased decoy-state RFI-QKDs. Moreover, considering the influence of statistical fluctuations and 
different misalignments of reference frames, the biased decoy-state RFI-QKD is more efficient and 
practicable than those biased decoy-state BB84-QKDs. We hope that this work could provide a 
valuable reference for practical implementations of decoy-state RFI-QKDs. 
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